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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, I offer a suggested taxonomy in the form of a filter 
(see	Figure	A) to aid in the productive discussion of animal protection 
legislation.  The filter is designed to migrate discussions towards 
objective analysis and away from frenetic labels of animal rights 
zealotry.  The filter is demonstrated in this Article using California’s foie 
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California’s prohibition on the sale of foie gras produced through 
force-feeding methods has been characterized as a “ban” on the 
product.1  This law was crafted to address an inhumane force-feeding 
practices,2 and continues to allow for the sale of foie gras that is not 
produced through force-feeding methods.3  
 
*Associate Professor of Business Law, California Polytechnic State University, Orfalea 
College of Business, San Luis Obispo, California; Active Member of CA Bar (170669).  The 
author extends his thanks to, and acknowledges his appreciation of, Jessica Stookey for 
her valuable input, comments, and assistance, as well as the Editorial Board of Seton Hall 
Legislative Journal.  
1CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25980-25984 (2020); see	generally California	Foie	Gras	
Ban	Goes	 Into	Effect	After	Supreme	Court	Rejects	Challenge, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 7, 
2019, 5:05 PM),	https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-foie-gras-prohibition-court-
ruling-20190107-story.html; Jonathan Kauffman, California	 Foie	 Gras	 Ban	 Upheld	
Though	Chefs	Vow	To	Fight	On, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Jan. 7, 2019, updated Jan. 8, 
2019 7:03 AM),	https://www.sfchronicle.com/food/article/California-s-foie-gras-ban-
upheld-though-chefs-13514763.php;	 Lawrence Hurley, U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	 Rejects	
Challenge	 To	 California	 Foie	 Gras	 Ban, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2019 11:11 AM),	
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-foiegras/u-s-supreme-court-rejects-
challenge-to-california-foie-gras-ban-idUSKCN1P11LD.			
 2 Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140 (9th 
Cir. 2017), cert.	denied 139 S.Ct. 862 (2019) (“California’s law was designed to rectify 
what the state considered an inhumane feeding practice. See 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 
904 (S.B. 1520) (Legislative Counsel’s Digest) (seeking to establish provisions for force-
feeding birds similar to those already in place for ‘keeping horses or other equine 
animals’).  According to the legislative analysis of the law, force-feeding commonly 
requires a worker to hold the bird between her knees, grasp the bird’s head, insert a 10- 
to 12-inch metal or plastic tube into the bird’s esophagus, and deliver large amounts of 
concentrated meal and compressed air into the bird. See,	e.g., Cal. Assemb. Comm. on 
Bus. & Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 4–5 (June 20, 2004); 
Cal. Sen. Comm. on Bus. & Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 5–
6 (May 6, 2004).  The bird is force-fed up to three times a day for several weeks and its 
liver grows to ten times the size of a normal liver. Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Bus. & 
Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 5 (June 20, 2004).  This 
process is apparently ‘so hard on the birds that they would die from the pathological 
damage it inflicts if they weren’t slaughtered first.’ Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Bus. & 
Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Aug. 17, 2004); Cal. Sen. 
Comm. on Bus. & Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 3 (Aug. 25, 
2004).  In enacting the force-feeding ban, California also considered a study conducted 
by the European Union’s Scientific Committee on Animal Health and an Israeli Supreme 
Court decision.  The European Union study concluded that force-feeding is detrimental 
to the welfare of birds, and the Israeli Supreme Court similarly concluded that force-
feeding causes birds pain and suffering. Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Bus. & Professions, 
Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 6–7 (June 20, 2004); Cal. Sen. Comm. on 
Bus. & Professions, Analysis of S.B. 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 7–8 (May 6, 2004).  In 
light of these and other factors, California decided to enact the ban, joining a growing list 
of countries around the world.”)  Id. at 1143-1144. 
 3 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25980-25981 (2020).  See	generally Lauren Frayer, 
This	Spanish	Farm	Makes	Foie	Gras	Without	Force	Feeding,	(August 1, 2016, 4:27 p.m.), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/08/01/487088946/this-spanish-farm-
makes-foie-gras-without-force-feeding; see	also	Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies 
du Quebec v. Harris, No. 2:12-CV-05735-SVW-RZ, 2020 WL 595440, at 3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 
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Force-feeding is the predominant method of production,4 and 
descriptions about the process are unsettling,5 although proponents 
 
14, 2020) (“Neither this Court nor the Ninth Circuit has ever concluded that § 25982 
constitutes a total ban on foie gras—that is a legal conclusion not ascertainable from a 
conclusory allegation.”).  
	 4	 See	CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25982 (2020) (“A product may not be sold in 
California if it is the result of force-feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s 
liver beyond normal size.”)  See	 also,	 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25980(b) (2020) 
(“Force-feeding a bird means a process that causes the bird to consume more food than 
a typical bird of the same species would consume voluntarily.  Force-feeding methods 
include, but are not limited to, delivering feed through a tube or other device inserted 
into the bird’s esophagus.”) 	See	generally Mariann Sullivan and David J. Wolfson, What’s	
Good	 for	 the	Goose	 .	.	.	The	 Israeli	Supreme	Court,	Foie	Gras,	and	 the	Future	of	Farmed	
Animals	in	the	United	States,	70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 139, 144 (Winter 2007) (“Foie gras, 
the fatty liver of a goose or duck, can only be produced if birds are force-fed, since, on 
their own, birds would not eat enough to cause their livers to reach the desired state of 
fattiness.”); Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 
1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017), cert.	denied 139 S.Ct. 862 (2019) (“In the final stage of the 
feeding process, which lasts up to thirteen days, the birds are force-fed in a process 
called gavage, during which feeders use ‘a tube to deliver the feed to the crop sac at the 
base of the duck’s esophagus.”); and  Michaela Anne DeSoucey, Gullet	 Politics;	
Contentious	Foie	Gras	Politics	and	the	Organization	of	Public	Morality	in	the	United	States	
and	 France 28 (December 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern 
University) (on file with ProQuest LLC, UMI Number: 3419034) (“The process of feeding 
ducks and geese to produce foie gras, called gavage in French, is what is at the heart of 
international contention surrounding the morality of foie gras production.”).   
 5 D.A. Jeremy Telman, Is	The	Quest	For	Corporate	Responsibility	A	Wild	Goose	Chase?		
The	Story	Of	Lovenheim	v.	Iroquois	Brands,	Ltd.,	44 AKRON L. REV. 479, 502 (2011) (“[T]he 
process of force-feeding usually begins when the birds are four-months old.  At farms at 
which the process has been mechanized, the birds are placed in a metal brace and the 
neck is stretched so that a funnel may be inserted 10-12 inches down the bird’s throat.  
Four hundred grams of corn mash are then pumped into the birds’ stomachs, while an 
elastic band around its neck prevents regurgitation.  Where the process is done by hand, 
the feeder uses a funnel and a stick to force the mash down the bird’s throat.  The birds 
are force-fed for between 15 and 28 days, and shortly thereafter they are slaughtered.  
During the brief period of force-feeding, the geese double their weight, but their livers 
swell until they account for up to 10% of the bird’s total weight.  An ordinary goose liver 
weighs about 120 grams; the liver of a force-fed bird weighs between 800 and 1000 
grams.  Up to 10% of the birds die before they can be slaughtered as a result of the forced 
feeding.”); see	also	Sullivan and Wolfson,	supra	note 4, at 144 (“The resulting swelling of 
the liver is commonly considered a pathological state called ‘hepatic lipidosis’ or ‘fatty 
liver disease’,’ and, presumably, the breakdown in liver function causes the birds to feel 
extremely ill.  The dramatic increase in liver size also makes walking and breathing 
difficult.  Mortality levels increase, and the birds would die if they were not taken for 
slaughter.  The pre-slaughter mortality rate for foie gras production is up to twenty 
times the average rate on other bird farms.”; Yossi Wolfson, Animal	Protection	Under	
Israeli	Law,	in	ANIMAL LAW AND WELFARE – INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 161	(Deborah Cao & 
Steven White eds., 2016) (“Fatty liver, the production of which is the raison	d’etre of the 
industry, is by definition a liver in pathological state of hypertrophy and steatosis—
enlarged and fat.  This pathological condition can only be reached by coercive process 
of forcibly introducing large quantities of food, high in carbohydrates, to the birds’ 
intestines.  This is generally done by shoving a pipe into the bird’s esophagus, and 
compressing the food through it using mechanical, hydraulic or pneumatic pressure.  
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argue that the lack of a gag reflex in ducks and geese helps justify the 
practice.6 
Legislators built a grace period of over seven years into this law to 
allow for alteration of the prohibited force-feeding practices.7  
Prolonged litigation to defeat the law has not been fruitful,8  but a July 
2020 court determination clarified that the California foie gras law 
allows for import and consumption of restricted foie gras if the 
underlying sale occurs outside of the state.9  New York City also recently 
 
The enlarged liver presses other organs, which causes difficulties in breathing and in 
walking—another problem which is inherent and unavoidable.  While there may be 
some variations of technique, animal suffering cannot be substantially reduced while 
still producing the desired product.”). 
	 6	 See	 Joshua D. Hodes, 2004	Legislative	Review,	11 ANIMAL L. 325, 362 (2005) (“A 
staff veterinarian for the California Department of Food and Agriculture has already said 
that ducks have no gag reflex . . . .”); Kristin Cook, Comment:	The	Inhumanity	Of	Foie	Gras	
Production	‐	Perhaps	California	And	Chicago	Have	The	Right	Idea,	2 J. Animal L. & Ethics 
263, 265 (May, 2007) (“Producers also claim that the process is not injurious to the birds 
because the feeding only takes a short time and because the birds lack a gag reflex.”). 
 7 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25984(c) (2020).  See	also,	Ass’n des Éleveurs de 
Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2017), cert.	denied 
139 S.Ct. 862 (2019) (“California’s legislature intended to ban not foie gras itself, but 
rather the practice of producing foie gras by force-feeding.  The law’s author, Senator 
John Burton, made clear when he introduced the bill that it ‘has nothing to do . . . with 
banning foie gras’ and that it prohibits only the ‘inhumane force-feeding [of] ducks and 
geese.’  Then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger echoed this sentiment in his signing 
statement: ‘This bill’s intent is to ban the current foie gras production practice of forcing 
a tube down a bird’s throat to greatly increase the consumption of grain by the bird.  It 
does not ban the food product, foie gras.’ Signing Message of Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, Sen. Bill 1520, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess. (Sept. 29, 2004).  The legislature 
provided more than seven and a half years between the passage of the law and its 
effective date to allow producers to transition to producing foie gras without force-
feeding.”) 
	 8	 See	Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Becerra, 139 S. Ct. 862 
(2019) (denying review of the Ninth Circuit’s determination that California’s ban on 
force-feeding of birds for the production of foie gras was not pre-empted by federal law).  
See	 also, Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 574 U.S. 932 
(2014); Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies du Quebec v. Harris, No. 2:12-CV-05735-
SVW-RZ, 2020 WL 595440, at 3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2020). 
 9 Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies du Quebec v. Harris, No. 2:12-cv-05735-
SVW-RZ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131895 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2020) (“Accordingly, the Court 
concludes the most reasonable interpretation of § 25982, in accordance with the intent 
of California and the plain language of the statute, does not encompass the factual 
scenario presented by Plaintiffs.  The Court holds that a sale of foie gras does not violate 
§ 25982 when:  
- The Seller is located outside of California. 
- The foie gras being purchased is not present within California at the time of sale.  
- The transaction is processed outside of California (via phone, fax, email, website, or 
otherwise).  
- Payment is received and processed outside of California, and  
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restricted sales of foie gras produced through force-feeding practices, 
effective in 2022.10  
Supporters of the California foie gras law have been met with 
accusations of animal rights extremism, along with labels of zealotry 
and other sullying terminology.11  “Animal rights activists are often 
called nut jobs, wackos, and extremists—and that is by our friends and 
family members.”12  Such labels and rhetoric are counterproductive to 
the discussion.  “The willingness of humans to exploit animals for their 
benefit has been labeled homocentric, narcissistic, and parasitic, while 
animal advocates’ preoccupation with animal rights has been called 
fanatical and misanthropic.”13 
All of the extensive legal battles surrounding this topic raise the 
specter of a larger issue: how should legislators, regulators, courts, and 
the public evaluate laws related to the treatment of animals?14   
In order to help address this dichotomy, this Article offers a 
taxonomy for analyzing and discussing animal protection legislation in 
the form of a cone-shaped “filter” using associated theories within the 
 
- The foie gas is given to the purchaser or a third-party delivery service outside of 
California, and ‘[t]he shipping company [or purchaser] thereafter transports the product 
to the recipient designated by the purchaser,’ even if the recipient is in California. Dkt. 
218 at 5.  
This judgement is limited to the circumstances described above, and does not 
encompass situations wherein the Seller is present in California during the sale, or the 
foie gras is already present in California when the sale is made.”) Id. at 12.  
 10 N.Y.C., ADMIN. CODE, §§17-1901 THROUGH 17-1903; see	 also, Jeffery C. Mays and 
Amelia Nierenberg, Foie	Gras	Served	In	1,000	Restaurants	 in	New	York	City	Is	Banned, 
N.Y.TIMES, (October 30, 2019),	https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/nyregion/foie-
gras-ban-nyc.html; Leah Asmelash, New	 York	 City	Will	 Ban	 Restaurants	 and	 Grocery	
Stores	 from	 Selling	 Foie	 Gras,	 CNN (Oct. 31, 2019, 11:51 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/30/us/foie-gras-new-york-ban-trnd/index.html; New	
York	 City	 lawmakers	 pass	 bill	 banning	 foie	 gras,	 AP (Oct. 30, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/30/new-york-city-expected-to-pass-bill-banning-
foie-gras.html). 
	 11	 See	generally	Kauffman, supra note 1 (referred to as “vegan extremists” by chef’s 
coalition opposing California foie gras law); Steve Cuozzo, Opinion:	Why	Ban	Foie	Gras	
But	 Not	 Other	 Meats	 Rooted	 In	 Animal	 Cruelty, NY POST (FEB. 4, 2019),	
https://nypost.com/2019/02/04/why‐ban‐foie‐gras‐but‐not‐other‐meats‐rooted‐in‐
animal‐cruelty/		(“. . .  count on animal-rights zealots . . .”); Elena Ferretti, Chefs	Say	Foie	
Gras	Ban	Could	 Spread	Beyond	California, FOX NEWS (MAY 18, 2012, updated Nov. 21, 
2016),	 https://www.foxnews.com/food‐drink/chefs‐say‐foie‐gras‐ban‐could‐spread‐
beyond‐california	(“. . .  animal rights activists . . .”).   
 12 Diane M. Sullivan, Holly Vietzke & Michael L. Coyne, A	 Modest	 Proposal	 For	
Advancing	Animal	Rights,	71 ALBANY L. REV. 1129 (2008). 
 13 Stephen A. Plass, Exploring	Animal	Rights	As	An	Imperative	For	Human	Welfare,	
112 W.VA.L.REV. 403, 405 (Winter, 2010). 
 14 For purposes of brevity in this article, references to animals means non-human 
animals. 
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filter.  This Article uses the California foie gras law as an exemplar.  The 
proposed filter is intended to facilitate meaningful inquiry and dialogue 
in the debate surrounding rights and treatment of animals, as “the State 
has an interest in preventing animal cruelty . . . . “15  The filter is designed 
to help analyze purported animal protection legislation and expose both 
the flaws and strengths in such laws. 
II.  WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS? 
A.	Our	Contradictory	Relationship	With	Animal	Welfare	
Our relations with animals “are based on contradiction.  We coddle 
them, eat them, leave our estates to them, experiment on them, buy 
them designer collars and clothes, wear them, risk our lives for them, 
and abandon and kill them.”16   
In the context of the California foie gras law, one might question the 
rationale for legislation regarding treatment of an animal whose 
ultimate fate is to be eaten.  The short answer is that “determining what 
it means to treat animals humanely involves our [human] values, not 
just the qualities of any given animal.”17  Traversing the bridge to 
concerns about food animal treatment opens an important dialogue on 
the legality and ethics of raising and eating food animals, as well as the 
treatment of all animals.18  Moreover, if the certainty of future death of 
animals destined for slaughter eradicates the need for concern over 
such animals, then every living thing (including humans) would be 
undeserving of any scintilla of concern, as future death is the only 
certainty.19   
 
 15 Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 952 
(9th Cir. 2013).  See	also, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (“[T]he 
prohibition of animal cruelty itself has a long history in American law, starting with the 
early settlement of the Colonies.”).  
 16 Ani B. Satz, Animals	 as	 Vulnerable	 Subjects:	 Beyond	 Interest‐Convergence,	
Hierarchy	and	Property,	16 ANIMAL L. 65, 67 (2009). 
 17 Craig A. Wenner, Note:	Judicial	Review	and	the	Human	Treatment	of	Animals,	86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1630, 1631 (2011). 
	 18	 See	generally Joan MacLeod Heminway & Patricia Graves Lenaghan, Safe	Haven	
Conundrum:	The	Use	of	Special	Bailments	to	Keep	Pets	Out	of	Violent	Households, 12 TENN. 
J. L. & POL’Y 79, 113 (2017) (“[A]nimals ‘are either persons, beings to whom the principle 
of equal consideration applies and who possess morally significant interests in not 
suffering or things, beings to whom the principle of equal consideration does not apply 
and whose interests may be ignored if it benefits us.’”); see	also Peter Singer, All	Animals	
Are	Equal, 1 PHILOSOPHIC EXCHANGE 103 (1974); see	also	Sherry Colb, Subject	of	a	Death, 
105 CORNELL L. REV. 205, 220 (2020). 
	 19	 See	generally Andrew Benton, Personal	Autonomy	and	Physician	Assisted	Suicide:	
The	Appropriate	Response	 to	a	Modern	Ethical	Dilemma, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 769, 778 
(1994) (“[D]eath is certain.” (quoting American Medical Association, Report B of the 
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A review of the historical and philosophical roots of the human 
contradictory relationship with animals sheds some light on how we 
have ended up in the current state of affairs.   
The ontology of the human impetus to disregard animal 
interests is unclear.  It may be attributed to early religious 
thought embracing human dominion over animals. Some early 
philosophers also disregarded animals.  The Stoics, possibly 
shaping the development of religious views about animals, 
believed humans did not possess moral obligations towards 
animals lacking the ability to engage in ethical decision-
making or virtuous activity.20  
Viewing only humans as possessing a soul, morality, or 
intelligence21 is an abrogation of the facts,22 as well as a dereliction of 
duties, with regard to animal welfare.23   
“And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and 
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the 
air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping 
 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association (1991))); 
Michael S. Greve, Our	Federalism	 is	Not	Europe’s,	 It’s	Becoming	Argentina’s, 7 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 42 (2012) (“As Thomas Hobbes taught, the fear of death never 
prompts individual action: death is certain, and fear of it is a constant.”); Continental 
Assur. Co., Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 474, 482 (Ct. Cl. 1934) (“While death is certain, 
the uncertain and contingent event is when the individual will die.”).  
 20 Satz, supra	note 16, at n. 3. 
 21 Laura G. Kniaz, Animal	Liberation	and	the	Law:		Animals	Board	the	Underground	
Railroad,	 43 BUFFALO L. REV. 765, 770-771 (Winter, 1995) (“Despite the opposition’s 
efforts, there is an increasing body of literature blurring the distinctions between 
humans and other animals, whether one looks to genetic differences, language 
capabilities, morality, intelligence, the ability to make and use tools, or possession of a 
soul.  Thus, numerous studies persuasively demonstrate that at least some animals 
possess each of these allegedly unique human qualities.”). 
	 22	 Id.;	see	also,	Joyce Tischler, Symposium: International	Wildlife	Trafficking:	Law	and	
Policy,	33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 485, 505 (2015) (“During the Roman Empire, the slaughter 
of both Christians and animals was carried out as entertainment.  Early Christian 
theologists emphasized the uniqueness of human beings, and placed great emphasis on 
humanity possessing immortal souls, as a way to separate humans from animals, and 
encourage greater compassion toward human beings.  The idea that human life is 
sacrosanct stems from this early Christian theology.  Sadly, greater compassion for 
animals was left out of this equation, and that dichotomy persists to the present day.  
Other religions have been more open to acknowledging that beings other than humans 
can possess souls.  Some religions claim that plants and rocks have souls.”). 
	 23	 See	Plass, supra note 13, at n. 72 (“[W]e must care for animals and spare them 
unnecessary suffering.” (quoting Statement	of	 the	Right	Reverend	Monsignor	LeRoy	E.	
McWilliams, President of The National Catholic Society for Animal Welfare, 87th Cong. 
2d Sess. At 63-65 (Sep. 28 & 29, 1962))); M. Varn Chandola, Dissecting	American	Animal	
Protection	Law:	Healing	the	Wounds	With	Animal	Rights	and	Eastern	Enlightenment, 8 
WIS. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 6 (2002) (“A diverse array of groups generally agree with the concept 
of animal welfare which basically states that cruelty to animals should be minimized to 
the extent of not inflicting unnecessary pain and suffering upon them.”). 
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thing that creepeth upon the earth.”24  This sentiment lends some insight 
into how and why humans might disregard animal welfare.25  But, 
perceived human domination over all other creatures in religious 
doctrine does not necessarily abrogate the human obligation to animals:   
[T]he Qur’an classifies humans as superior to animals and as 
occupying a privileged status.  As part of this privilege, as 
Earth’s conscientious stewards, humans are responsible for 
protecting and serving each other as well as the ecosystem.  
This framework mandates to humans a responsibility to care 
for and protect animals as vicegerents.26 
B.		Concerns	Of	Mirrored	Behavior	
A sharp distinction is necessary between humans and 
‘animals’ if we are to bend them to our will, make them work 
for us, wear them, eat them—without any disquieting tinges 
of guilt or regret. With untroubled consciences, we can render 
whole species extinct—for our perceived short-term benefit, 
 
	 24	 Genesis 1:26	(King James).  Contra,	Ecclesiastes	3:19-20 (King James) (“	For that 
which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the 
one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no 
preeminence above a beast: for all is vanity.  All go unto one place; all are of the dust, 
and all turn to dust again.”); but	see	Sullivan, Vietzke, and Coyne, supra	note 12, at 1136. 
	 25	 See	generally	Yossi Wolfson,	 supra	note 5, at 157-158. (“The land between the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River saw some of the earliest centers of human 
civilization, including some of the first stages of the subordination of non-human 
animals.  This was later also the site of development of some of the oldest laws 
protecting non-human animals from their human exploiters—the laws contained in the 
Bible.  These laws took for granted hierarchy among humans and between humans and 
non-humans.  Despite some dissenting voices in the Bible that view meat-eating 
negatively (Genesis 1, 29; Numbers 11, 4—35; Deuteronomy 12, 20-28; Amos 6, 4 and 
more), it generally approved of the exploitation of animals for labor and of their use and 
killing for food and for raw materials.  Nevertheless, it perceived them as living beings, 
sharing the world (on a non-equal basis) with humans, according to an order dictated 
by God (Genesis 9, 8-17).  True to this ideology, the Bible allows animal exploitation, but 
puts limits on it: Animals must be allowed to rest on the Sabbath (Exodus 20, 10; 
Deuteronomy 5, 14); an ox may not be muzzled while treading out cereals (Deuteronomy 
25, 4); one must unload a donkey that fell under the weight of his burden (Exodus 23, 5); 
one may take a bird’s eggs or fledglings—but not together with the mother and not while 
she is watching (Deuteronomy 22, 6-7).). 
 26 Engy Abdelkader, Animal	Protection	Theory	in	U.S.	and	Islamic	Law:	A	Comparative	
Analysis	with	A	Human	Rights	Twist,	14 UCLA J. ISLAMIC AND NEAR E. L. 45, 51 (2015) 
(emphasis added); Id. at 57 (“On the one hand, the Qur’an draws similarities between 
the animal kingdom and its human counterpart; on the other, animals are subjugated to 
human control on an as-needed basis.”); Id.	at 56 (“According to the majority view, the 
Qur’an permits humans to dominate and benefit from animals for various purposes; the 
Hadith explicate that such objectives are necessary.  Such purposes, the Qur’an indicates, 
include warmth and protection, derived from animals’ wool and fur, food and drink 
(such as milk), and the transportation of humans and heavy cargo.”).   
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or even through simple carelessness. Their loss is of little 
import: Those beings, we tell ourselves, are not like us.27   
For those who do not subscribe to animal protection as an 
underlying obligation to fellow living beings with whom we share the 
earth, perhaps a purely human-centric justification will be persuasive.28  
In that realm, we know that abuse of animals by a human correlates 
closely to abuse of other humans by that same individual.29   
Awareness of the correlation between animal cruelty and 
domestic abuse is growing.  A survey of fifty of the largest 
women’s shelters in the United States showed that eighty-five 
percent of women and sixty-three percent of children spoke 
of instances of animal abuse in their homes.  Batterers often 
control and intimidate their victims by abusing or even killing 
the victims’ companion animals.  Furthermore, children 
witnessing animal and domestic abuse are more likely to 
become animal abusers themselves. 
 
 
 27 Kniaz, supra	 note 21, at 770, (quoting CARL SAGAN & ANN DRUYAN, SHADOWS OF 
FORGOTTEN ANCESTORS: A SEARCH FOR WHO WE ARE 365 (1992)). 
	 28	 See	Brieanah Schwartz, Standing	on	Four	Legs	or	Two?, 4 MID-ATLANTIC J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 202, 226 (2018) (“This holding implies that the purpose of animal cruelty statutes 
is to determine whether the perpetrator meant to inflict harm on the owner.  Therefore, 
Garcia stands for a human-centric approach to animal protection statutes, where the 
animal harmed can stand to benefit if there is a claim benefitting the human owner.”); 
Darian M. Ibrahim, The	Anticruelty	Statute:	A	Study	 in	Animal	Welfare, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & 
ETHICS 175, 178 (2006) (“To determine whether an animal is subjected to unnecessary 
suffering, the human interests from animal exploitation must be balanced against the 
animal interests in not suffering.  If the human interest prevails in any given situation, 
the animal suffering is permitted; if the animal interest prevails, the suffering is not 
permitted.”).  
 29 Plass, supra	note 13, at 420 (“By collecting data about violent incarcerated men, 
individuals prosecuted for intentional cruelty to animals, serial killers, and violent 
juvenile offenders, among others, it was determined that these individuals abused 
animals at a much higher rate than their non-violent counterparts.  Based on such 
studies, it is then suggested that animal abuse is part of the developmental history of 
violent adults, and so, in some sense, animal abuse is a dress rehearsal or training 
ground for later violence against other humans.”); see	also Chandola supra note 23, at 5-
6 (“[S]tudies by behavioral scientists also reveal the correlation between cruelty to 
animals and violent crime.  Studies have shown that a statistically significant number of 
criminals who committed acts of violence against humans have a history of cruelty to 
animals.  Prosecutors are gradually realizing that violent acts directed towards humans 
and animals are not separate distinct forms of violence, but are part of a cycle.  Although 
research concerning the relationship between violence against humans and animals is 
relatively recent, it is definitely not a novel idea.  In 1887, the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi in an opinion delivered by Justice Arnold, stated that it was important for 
society to consider the welfare of animals.  The Court noted that animals were probably 
capable of feeling as much pain and pleasure as humans.”). 
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A study surveying women’s shelters in Northern Utah 
substantiates the animal abuse and interpersonal violence 
correlation.  The study found that seventy-four percent of the 
women entering the shelter had a companion animal or had 
owned one within the last twelve months.  Of these women, 
seventy-one percent reported that their partner had either 
threatened to harm––or actually harmed––a companion 
animal.  Many of the abusive partners were actively violent 
toward the animals: actual harm or killing of animals was 
reported by [fifty-seven percent] of the women with pets and 
included acts of omission (e.g., neglecting to feed or allow 
veterinary care) but most often acts of violence.  Examples 
reported included slapping, shaking, throwing, or shooting 
dogs and cats, drowning a cat in a bathtub, and pouring lighter 
fluid on a kitten and igniting it. 30  
Cross-reporting laws also exist for animal cruelty and child abuse.31  
“These laws recognize the concept that if one member of a household is 
being neglected or mistreated, then it is possible that other members 
might be as well.”32  In this context, the fact that an animal member of 
the household is subject to neglect or mistreatment triggers concern 
that human members of the same household are suffering the same 
abuse.33  
C.	Species	Supremacy	
The biased human tendency to discredit animal welfare rests upon 
a foundation of human superiority.34  This perceived superiority is 
disquieting because it resembles, in so many ways, the same belief 
systems that support any other form of perceived supremacy and 
resultant oppression.  The supremacist believes that anybody who does 
 
 30 Blair McCrory & Shannon Douglass, 2006	Legislative	Review,	13 ANIMAL L. 299, 
312-313 (Marjorie A. Berger ed.) (2007).  See	also, Constance Lindner, Domestic	Abuse	
and	Protecting	Pets, CATNIP (CUMMINGS SCHOOL OF VETERINARY MEDICINE AT TUFTS UNIVERSITY) 
7-9 (October 2016). 
	 31	 See Jonathan R. Lovvorn, Animal	Law	In	Action:		The	Law,	Public	Perception,	And	
The	Limits	Of	Animal	Rights	Theory	As	A	Basis	For	Legal	Reform,	12 ANIMAL L. 133, 134-
135 (2006); see	also Berger, supra note 30, at 315 (“2. Cross Reporting.  Protective orders 
for animals were not the only legislative acknowledgement of a correlation between 
domestic abuse and animal cruelty this year.  West Virginia and Tennessee both passed 
laws that require the cross reporting of animal cruelty and child abuse.”). 
 32 Berger, supra note 30, at 315.	
 33 Berger, supra note 30, at 315. 
	 34	 See	generally	Colb,	supra note 18, at 220 (“Singer has long demanded that we stop 
ignoring the moral implications of using animals. He has compared such speciesism to 
racism . . . .  Regan also resisted speciesism.”).	
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not align in certain designated traits with him/her is inferior.35  This sort 
of species supremacy enables humans to justify condescension towards 
the animal kingdom.36 
 
	 35	 See	Yxta Maya Murray, From	Here	I	Saw	What	Happened	And	I	Cried:	Carrie	Mae	
Weems’	Challenge	To	The	Harvard	Archive,	8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 65 (2012-
13), (“In an almost eerie—but in hindsight, predictable—synchronicity, Trope and Echo-
Hawk cite Samuel George Morton’s head-hunting raids of Native American bodies as an 
impetus for the law.  As noted above, Morton’s policy of crania-collecting and measuring 
supposedly proved Indians’ separate species genesis as well as their inferiority.  Agassiz 
drew much inspiration from Morton’s collection of 600 Native American crania and used 
Morton’s measurements as support for his separate, inferior species theory.  The 
resulting demotion of Native Americans led to their capture in reservations, and served 
as a justification for genocide.”); see	also Megan A. Senatori, The	Second	Revolution:	The	
Diverging	 Paths	 of	Animal	Activism	And	 Environmental	 Law,	 8 WIS.ENVNTL.L.J. 31, 36 
(2002) (“In 1975, philosopher Peter Singer began a second revolution, this time 
challenging humankind’s homocentric view of the worth of animals.  Singer’s 
controversial book, ANIMAL LIBERATION, emerged as another call to consciousness 
arguing that what allows human beings to completely disregard the worth of animals is 
a form of discrimination known as ‘speciesism.’  According to Singer, speciesism ‘is a 
prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species 
and against those of members of other species.’  Singer argues that even the most 
ordinary humans rationalize the inhumane treatment of animals by simply viewing the 
interests of their own species as superior to those of other life forms.  Harvard Law 
Professor and animal law scholar, Steven M. Wise, calls this phenomenon ‘teleological 
anthropocentrism,’ or a notion that the universe was designed solely to serve human 
beings.”).  But	 see Maneesha Deckha, Holding	 Onto	Humanity:	 Animals,	 Dignity,	 and	
Anxiety	in	Canada’s	Assisted	Human	Reproduction	Act,	5 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 21, 
53-54 (2009) (“While the fluidity and constructedness of species are acknowledged in 
contemporary biology, the social construction of species difference persists and 
continues to be inflected by currents of race, gender, culture, sexuality and other 
seemingly anthropogenic concepts.  There is a continuing impulse to articulate human 
identity as the marker for ethical consideration and animal identity as the excluded 
Other.  The AHRA participates in this modernist narrative, defining human dignity in 
relation to animal commodification. In embodying commodification and species anxiety 
through its prohibitive provisions, the AHRA contributes to this long-standing narrative 
within Western cultures of articulating, with mixed success, human identity through 
juxtaposing it with imagined ideas of animality.”), and Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma,	Law,	
And	Advocacy	For	Animals,	1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 63, 109 (May, 2006) (“For most of 
human history, other animals and humans were largely cohabiters - a reality 
conditioned by the foraging way of life.  Changing climatic conditions facilitated the 
emergence of hunting.  This change in the method of material accumulation was 
necessarily accompanied by ideas that assuaged human guilt, ideas that were embedded 
in social and religious practices and beliefs.  The ascent of agricultural society gradually 
transformed human oppression of other animals into a mundane practice.  Interhuman 
relationships also changed profoundly during these periods, and not for the better.  The 
mistreatment of humans and other animals was not stimulated by prejudice; rather, 
prejudice resulted from the socially constructed ideological systems that legitimated 
oppression.”).   
	 36	 See	Jay Shooster, Justice	For	All:	Including	Animal	Rights	In	Social	Justice	Activism, 
40 HARBINGER 39, 40-41 (OCTOBER 15, 2015) (“Social justice advocates recognize that 
treating someone differently solely because of their race, class, gender, nationality, 
sexual orientation, or disability is almost always wrong.  That is because we know that 
for almost all decisions, these characteristics are morally irrelevant.  Just like racism, 
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Animal protection ultimately relies upon the value that humans 
place upon the well-being of non-humans.37  In order to engage in a 
rational, methodical, and ethical evaluation of animal treatment, we 
must avoid seeking some mythical convergence of an intersection 
between human and animal.  Instead, the inquiry should ask who and 
 
sexism, and classism, speciesism focuses on one morally arbitrary characteristic: 
species, and uses that to justify violence and inequality.  After all, what does a number 
of chromosomes or an opposable thumb have to do with whether or not someone should 
live or die?”); Daniel Mishori, Environmental	 Vegetarianism:	 Conflicting	 Principles,	
Constructive	Virtues, 11 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 253, 263 (Nov. 2017) (“The common 
denominator between evolving ecological ethics and the animal rights movement was 
opposition to the idea of human supremacy over all other creatures, which in 1970 was 
termed by British psychologist Richard D. Ryder ‘speciesism.’  The biocentric claim that 
animals have ‘rights’, which was articulated in various ways (including utilitarian and 
deontological ethics), implied that humans have duties to animals, such as the obligation 
to shield them from harm and exploitation.  Speciesism was seen as a form of 
discrimination and oppression, on par with other notorious types of prejudice such as 
racism, sexism and ageism.”); Joseph Lubinski, Screw	 The	 Whales,	 Save	 Me!	 	 The	
Endangered	Species	Act,	Animal	Protection,	And	Civil	Rights,	4 J. L. SOCIETY 377, 401-402 
(Winter 2003) (“Other animal advocates have compared human ‘speciesism’ to 
invidious forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism.  Gary Francione turns the 
degrading practice of treating humans as property on its head by equating it to the 
impropriety of treating animals as property.  He further compares the historical 
exploitation of people with our current exploitation of animals.”). 
	 37	 See	 infra	 note 52 and accompanying text.  See	 also,	 David S. Favre, Judicial	
Recognition	Of	The	Interests	Of	Animals	‐	A	New	Tort, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV 333, 363-364 
(Summer 2005) (“It is not expected that any animal has the capacity to call a lawyer and 
initiate a lawsuit . . . .  The courts are capable of discerning when a particular human is 
the appropriate party to pursue the interests of an animal.  In an indirect manner, two 
federal courts have allowed humans to pursue cases that furthered the interests of 
animals covered by federal law.  In at least one case in Florida, a court appointed a 
guardian ad litem for a Chimpanzee Trust.  The development of guidelines for the courts 
in resolving this issue will undoubtedly be the subject of future law review articles.  Our 
legal system has a number of mechanisms such as guardianships, next friends, legal 
representatives and social workers to deal with this issue.”); Antoinette Duck, Welcome	
To	Primates’	Paradise,	Human	Rights	Not	Allowed:	Unravelling	The	Great	Ape	Project,	7 
REGENT J. INT’L L. 165, 185 (2009)  (“The responsibilities and duties that exist toward 
animals are uniquely and specifically human. Why? Because man is a moral being, and 
the animal is not.  Animals do not protect other animals’ rights. Animals are not subject 
to ‘animal duties’ toward one another.  Rather, ‘animals’ rights’ are asserted against 
humanity, against mankind. If being human is not what burdens man with the obligation 
to treat animals humanely, then nothing does.  It is man’s humanity that burdens him 
with his duty toward the animals.  It is man’s humanity that burdens him with the 
responsibility of stewardship.”); Tischler, supra	note 22, at 492-493 (2015) (“So, why do 
humans have legal rights?  Do they descend from the heavens?  No; legal rights come 
from us.  As I mentioned earlier, human beings have been property.  In the past 150 
years in the U.S., the social contract about who gets rights, and who gets legal 
“personhood” protection, has expanded to include: people of color, women, children, 
gays, lesbians, transgender people, immigrants, Native Americans, people with mental 
and physical disabilities, and children.  Legal rights are established by us to protect our 
lives, our families, our property, and our values.  And they evolve.”). 
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what we want to be as humans.38  The answer to this question 
necessarily includes an underlying human obligation towards the 
welfare of other living creatures and our planet.39   
Analyzing and viewing animal rights legislation in this context 
removes us from a confined perspective of human superiority and 
launches us in the direction of enlightened care and concern for those 
subjected to our collective human will.40  Mere dominion need not 
equate to superiority: 
Here is the myth to make human beings feel their supremacy 
and their power.  Man alone is made in the image of God. Man 
alone is given dominion over all the animals and told to 
subdue the earth. . . .  The influence of Judeo-Christian 
insistence on the God-like nature of human beings is nowhere 
more apparent than in the standard Western doctrine of the 
sanctity of human life: a doctrine that puts the life of the most 
hopelessly and irreparably brain damaged human being—of 
 
	 38	 See	Favre, supra note 37, at 363-364; Duck, supra	note 37, at 185.  See	also,	Plass, 
supra	note 13, at 404 (“It is contended, for example, that the criterion for legal protection 
should be a living entity’s ability to suffer, as non-human animals certainly can and do.  
It is further contended that non-human animals, like humans, are ‘subjects of a life’ with 
beliefs, desires, emotions, identity, and other attributes of personhood that support the 
recognition of rights, and in that sense are equal.  Another perspective explains that 
animal rights theory is grounded in principles of ‘justice,’ which reject the use of animals 
as property.  That is to say animals have equal inherent value as humans and therefore 
are entitled to the same considerations as humans when decisions that affect their 
interests are being made.”).	
	 39	 See	 Wenner, supra	 note 17, at 1631 (“The law governing animal welfare is 
convoluted.  Animals receive some protection from maltreatment through state anti-
cruelty statutes.  These statutes typically guard only against wanton abuse that has no 
societally legitimate purpose.  They also tend to exempt common agricultural practices, 
meaning that as long as a particular method is standard within the industry, it is not 
cruel under the statute.  On the other hand, under the regulatory system at both the 
federal and state level, specific animals are sometimes afforded a level of ‘humane’ 
protection that exceeds what would otherwise be provided under the anti-cruelty 
statutes.  These laws prohibit activities that would not necessarily violate anti-cruelty 
statutes because they are not wanton—there is a purpose behind the pain and suffering 
inflicted on the animal—but they are characterized as inhumane nonetheless.. Through 
the use of humane standards, the regulatory system provides certain limited chances to 
exceed the baseline protections offered under anti-cruelty statutes.  However, if we are 
to ensure that regulations properly address relevant concerns and honestly represent 
our convictions and interests, courts must be willing to scrutinize agency regulations.  
Though states have different approaches to promulgating humane standards of care and 
different standards of review, one thing should remain clear: The humane treatment of 
animals is as much about us as it is about them.  ‘Humane’ should not be defined without 
questioning the value we place on animal pain and suffering, and, consequently, judicial 
review of agency action should ensure that this value is actually determined.”). 
	 40	 See	Wenner, supra	note 17, at 1631. 
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the kind whose level of awareness is not underestimated by 
the term ‘human vegetable’—above the life of a chimpanzee.41  
Service animals exemplify the idea of species supremacy.  Service 
animals and companion animals have become valued by society, not 
because of their status as animals, but because of their ability to serve 
human needs and hold economic value by virtue of their training and 
knowledge.42   
The fact that humans own animals necessarily implicates a 
linguistic bias regarding treatment.  “Ownership implies entitlements to 
the owner [but] . . . it does not necessarily translate into a right to do as 
one pleases…”43  Granting “person” status to animals does not address 
the underlying bias in ownership, however, because “[m]erely 
abolishing the property status of animals and granting them rights does 
not guarantee that they will cease to be exploited.”44   
D.	Anthropomorphism	Or	Simply	Respect	For	Another	Living	Being?	
“Anthropomorphism” is the human trait of “[g]iving human 
characteristics to animals, inanimate objects or natural phenomena.”45  
 
 41 Plass, supra	note 13, at 415, (quoting	PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 2-8 (2d. ed. 
1990)).	
 42 Sullivan, Vietzke, and Coyne, supra	note 12, at 1129-1130 (“In any discussion 
concerning animal rights, the question often arises as to the need to distinguish 
companion animals, like dogs and cats, from other animals.  Clearly, it is an easier 
argument to limit animal rights to our companion animals who occupy our homes and 
are near and dear to us.  However, such a distinction is too great a strain on science and 
compassion for us to promote without exploring the issue a bit deeper.  Although it 
would be easy to give into the distinction between companion animals and other 
animals, to do so ignores the fact that non-companion animals, like chimpanzees, have a 
genetic make-up very similar to ours.  They also have the capacity to experience great 
pain.  So to suggest that Rover or Kitty have rights and value beyond property, but a 
chimp does not, leads to an absurd conclusion: chimps can be seen as mere objects.  
Chimps can experience a broad array of emotions like joy, grief, and sadness. They are 
extremely intelligent and often serve as helpers to the disabled.  Their genetic make-up 
is nearly identical to ours.  So why should this living, breathing, and thinking being—
sometimes thinking even more than we do according to Japanese researchers—be 
relegated to the equivalent of the chair we sit on?  Cruelty and humane treatment of 
animals aside, tort law, contract law, wills and trusts law, and family law all deal with 
issues regarding companion animals (with the exception of actions for damages to 
livestock where the law actually grants more protection to the animals so long as it is 
part of one’s livelihood).”).  Id.  
 43 Robert Garner, Political	Ideology	And	The	Legal	Status	Of	Animals,	8 ANIMAL L. 77, 
81 (2002). 
	 44	 Id.	at 80. 
 45 Rick Nauert, Why	Do	We	Anthropomorphize?, PSYCHCENTRAL (Mar. 1, 2010; last 
updated June 15, 2019), http://psychcentral.com/news/2010/03/01/why-do-we-
anthropomorphize/11766.html. “[A]nthropomorphism was coined by the Greek 
philosopher Xenophanes when describing the similarity between religious believers 
and their gods—that is, Greek gods were depicted having light skin and blue eyes while 
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The notion that many humans attribute to animals the capacity to 
experience pain, happiness, and other feelings should not engender 
condescending proclamations from others that one’s empathy towards 
another living being is a form of radical extremism and 
anthropomorphization.46  Indeed, failure to consider how other living 
beings, including animals, are impacted by one’s behavior appears to 
controvert the golden rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you.”47   
Similar to humans, animals have subjective experiences and are 
conscious of the world around them.  In discussing the commonalities of 
human and animal behavior, Professor Brian Frye argued: 
Indeed, it is at least possible that all living things have some 
form of subjective experience and are conscious of the world 
in some way, even if we cannot possibly comprehend their 
subjective experience or consciousness.  Not only mammals 
but also reptiles and fish can be trained to solve problems.  
Insects engage in complicated social behaviors.  The lowly 
flatworm makes choices.  And even plants respond to external 
stimuli.48 
Is it possible that my cat engages in zoomorphism, the act of 
attributing animal traits to humans?  To me, she may be attributing 
sensory abilities, hunting skills, and other aspects of existence based 
upon her capacities as a sentient living being.  Perhaps this is why she 
will lay fearlessly in the middle of the floor at night, not realizing that 
my night vision skills are far short of her keen abilities.  Does this mean 
that my cat’s perceptions of me are entirely faulty?  Of course not; 
although I may not possess the exact level of abilities that she attributes 
to me (but certainly am guilty of the numerous flaws that she observes 
 
African gods had dark skin and brown eyes.” Id.  See	generally,	Tischler supra	note 22 at 
504 (“And while I like to rely on scientific studies for support of my positions, I regret 
that scientists often seem unwilling to advocate for animals, out of a fear that they will 
be criticized by their colleagues.  For example, certain scientists have witnessed animals 
exhibiting emotions, yet they refuse to compare that behavior to a human-like response 
in their published reports, because they don’t want to be accused of being 
anthropomorphic. But when you read reports, such as the one I mentioned earlier, of an 
elephant flopping-down on the ground and weeping, what are you going to think?  Why 
is the elephant doing that?  I presume the elephant is doing it for the same reason I 
would; well, I don’t flop down and cry too often, but isn’t it rational to assume that the 
elephant is acting out frustration, anger, or exasperation?  I can only assume that.  Why 
else would she do that?”). 
	 46	 See	Tischler, supra	note 22, at 504. 
	 47	 See	 generally	 Bill Puka, The	 Golden	 Rule,	 INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/goldrule/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
 48 Brian L. Frye, The	Lion,	The	Bat	&	The	Thermostat:	Metaphors	On	Consciousness,	5 
SAVANNAH L. REV. 13, 40 (2018). 
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in me), there is a reasonable line of commonality that we share in our 
existence as living beings.  Either of us attributing some sort of shared 
commonality of existence neither makes my cat a zoomorphist, nor I an 
anthropomorphist.  We are simply applying our respective knowledge 
and experiences in an effort to understand and afford respect to each 
other as living beings.  Labels of anthropomorphism evade the fact that 
“animals are sentient beings based on their capacity to suffer and 
thereby entitled to equal consideration of their interests.”49 
III.  COARSE, MEDIUM, OR FINE?  A PROPOSED “FILTER” BASED 
TAXONOMY TO AID IN THE ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION RELATED TO 
ANIMAL TREATMENT 
A.	An	Overview	
“Whether animals are the primary or secondary subjects of laws, 
or regulated for their own or human welfare, their legal treatment is 
defined by human interest.”50   
My proposed filter is intended as another tool to aid in revealing 
the strengths, weaknesses, and flaws in animal legislation.  Envision a 
cone-shaped filter, like a coffee filter, but with three different stages of 
filtration.  My proposal is that human-centric legislation is most 
appropriate for analysis at the coarse level; blended legislation that 
considers aspects of both animal and human protection is appropriate 
at the medium level of filtration; and animal-centric protective 
legislation proceeds into the fine level for additional analysis and 
discussion.  
This coffee filter analogy provides an additional approach to help 
analyze, debate, and discuss animal rights legislation, regardless of 
where an individual resides on the spectrum of animal protection.  
Analyzing animal rights legislation under the coffee filter analogy may 
also help fuel continuing improvements in such legislation.   
The proposed filter can also be used to help identify issues of 
interest convergence and legal gerrymandering.  Borrowing from the 
helpful terminology of animal protection expert Dr. Ani Satz, for 
example, there is an interest convergence in the foie gras ban that brings 
together those opposed to consuming animals and those who do 
consume animal flesh, but oppose the force-feeding method of 
production.51  Simultaneously, there is legal gerrymandering in the law 
 
 49 Satz, supra	note 16, at 76. 
 50 Satz, supra note 16,	at 83. 
 51 Satz, supra	note 16,	at 69. 
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that protects ducks and geese raised for foie gras, but does not protect 
those same animals when they are raised for meat sale or other 
purposes.52  This legal gerrymandering potentially “both undermines 
fundamental protections for animals and creates legal 
inconsistencies.”53  The filter is also intended to aid in identifying these 
types of issues.54  
B.	Is	There	Really	A	Need	To	Discuss	Animal	Protection	Legislation?	
Recognized animal protection proponent Jonathan Lovvorn has 
indicated that the key to humane treatment of animals may require 
sequestration into boundaries that the human masses can relate to.55   
We can make a good start by jettisoning our own 
revolutionary rhetoric - such as granting animals 
‘personhood’ or otherwise eliminating the property status of 
animals.  It is an intellectual indulgence and a vice for animal 
lawyers to concern ourselves with the advancement of such 
impractical theories while billions of animal languish in 
unimaginable suffering that we have the power to change.56   
Other than recognizing our duties as humans to be stewards and 
protectors of non-human animals, why is the discussion of animal rights 
legislation relevant?  The answer is that modern technology, food 
production, and medical research continue to progress in a direction 
that demands and requires attention.57   
High-tech factory farming techniques allow American 
agribusiness to raise and slaughter more than ten billion 
animals in the United States each year.  By supporting the 
confinement of animals to factory floors, technology requires 
newer and more sophisticated interventions to maintain the 
confinement, such as antibiotics and hormones.  Technology 
drives the use of millions more animals in biomedical 
research.  At the same time, it is because of technological 
advances in research techniques that animal advocates can 
credibly press for substitutes for some experimental animals.  
New uses of animal organs in humans, as well as the cloning 
and genetic manipulation of animals, are likely to increase the 
 
 52 Satz, supra note 16, at 83. 
 53 Satz, supra note 16, at 83.		See	also	infra	notes 123-125 and accompanying text.	
	 54	 See	generally	Satz, supra	note 16, at 83. 
	 55	 See	Lovvorn, supra	note 31, at 139. 
 56 Lovvorn, supra	note 31, at 139.  
 57 Ellen P. Goodman, Animal	Ethics	and	the	Law, 79 TEMP L. REV. 1291, 95-96 (2006) 
(reviewing CASS	R.	SUNDSTEIN	AND	MARTHA	C.	NUSSBAUM,	EDS.,	ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES 
AND NEW DIRECTIONS (2004)).	
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demand for animal exploitation while raising new questions 
about human duties to animals.58   
C.	The	Filter	In	Action	
In order to exemplify application of the filter, below is a description 
of each filter stage, along with discussion of pertinent theories at each 
stage of filtration.  It is impossible to cover all possible theories relevant 
at each level of the filter, but the examples below provide a foundational 
understanding of how the filter works.  Why the filter?  It would be 
unproductive and counterintuitive to analyze human-centric legislation 
(e.g. food safety) within the context of animal rights theories, or vice 
versa. 
1. Coarse Filtration: Human Centric  
“I got no emotions for anybody else; You better understand I’m in 
love with myself; myself; my beautiful self; No feelings . . . for anybody 
else.”59  Coarse filtration involves regulation motivated entirely by 
human self-interest.60  Legislation at this stage of the filter is based 
exclusively upon human benefit.  Any benefit to animals at the coarse 
stage is purely an unintended secondary result. 
The coarse level is relevant for inclusion in this analysis because 
laws related to animals often focus on human safety rather than animal 
treatment.61   
Animals receive legal protections only when their interests 
align with human interests.  Consider the following examples.  
Animals are not slaughtered prior to being ‘rendered 
insensible’ because of the cruelty involved as well as the 
reduced hazard for slaughterhouse workers, efficiency in 
processing, and economic gains associated with decreased 
bruising of flesh foods.  Downed pigs and sheep (animals too 
sick to stand) are not dragged or hauled to slaughter unless an 
inspector deems them fit for human consumption.  Animals in 
laboratories are entitled to enough shelter and food to keep 
 
	 58	 Id. 
 59 SEX PISTOLS, No	Feelings,	on	NEVER MIND THE BOLLOCKS: HERE’S THE SEX PISTOLS (Virgin 
Records 1977). 
	 60	 See	Satz, supra	note 16, at 67-68. 
 61 Satz, supra	note 16, at 85 (“Farm animals have no federal protections pertaining 
to their confinement or rearing because factory farms are the most efficient, and 
arguable the only, means to produce enough flesh foods to meet existing consumer 
demand.”).  See	also	id.	(“Haley’s Act, named after a young woman killed by a Siberian 
tiger while posing for a high school senior photo, would ban the use of large cats outside 
of sanctuaries and zoos because of their danger to humans, not because of the cruelty 
involved in keeping a large cat outside of its native environment.”).  
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them alive to facilitate research.  Companion animals are 
protected against cruelty in every state because of a desire to 
prevent harm to them as well as the value humans place on 
their relationships with them and the link between animal 
cruelty and violence against humans.62 
Food safety laws designed to protect human consumers of animal 
flesh or other animal food products appear at the coarse filtration level 
because these laws are about human interests, not animal protection.63  
Laws focused exclusively or primarily upon human safety in interacting 
with animals also fall within this category.  Laws filtered at the coarse 
level do not actually constitute animal protection or animal rights laws, 
even though some humans may mischaracterize them as such. 
A sample of theories associated with the coarse level of filtration 
include Descartes’ Theory, Moral Pluralism, and Chattel Theory.  
a. Descartes’ Theory   
It is well-settled that key philosophers, including Socrates, 
Aristotle, and Descartes, embraced the theory of absolute human 
superiority over animal welfare.64  “[P]hilosophers, like Rene Descartes, 
believed animals were machines without consciousness that could be 
dismantled, reconstructed, and discarded.”65  This brutal ideology, and 
 
 62 Satz, supra	note 16, at 67-68.  See	also,	Geoffrey C. Evans, Comment,	To	What	
Extent	 Does	Wealth	 Maximization	 Benefit	 Farmed	 Animals?	 	 A	 Law	 and	 Economics	
Approach	to	a	Ban	on	Gestation	Crates	in	Pig	Production, 13 ANIMAL L. 167, 170 (2006) 
(“Farmed animals in particular have very little protection in the United States. . . . Most 
states’ anticruelty statutes exempt ‘accepted,’ ‘common,’ ‘customary,’ or ‘normal’ 
farming practices. . . . [and] exclude poultry, which represent an estimated 95% of the 
. . . farm animals slaughtered annually.”).   
	 63	 See	Satz, supra	note 16, at 69-70 (“Animal laws are also the product of interest-
convergence.  Despite their nomenclature, animal welfare and anti-cruelty statutes 
protect human as well as animal interests.  The problem with providing animal 
protections in this manner is that when human and animal interests conflict, animal 
protections are reduced or eliminated to facilitate human use of animals.  Even one of 
the most basic animal interests—avoiding suffering—is ignored. Animals are anally 
shocked to death, drowned, suffocated, or gassed, so as not to damage their furs for 
fashion garments; subject to invasive experiments without appropriate pain relief or 
sedation to prevent drug interference with experimental results; tethered on short leads 
without sufficient shelter, food, or water for the entirety of their lives as guard animals; 
and intensively confined in dark, windowless warehouses for efficient meat production 
after being routinely castrated, de-beaked, and de-toed without anesthesia.”). 
	 64	 See	Denise R. Case, The	USA	Patriot	Act:	Adding	Bite	to	the	Fight	Against	Animal	
Rights	 Terrorism? 34 RUTGERS L.J. 187, 190 n.12 (2003) (“In addition to religious 
sentiments against animals, well known philosophers, such as Socrates, Aristotle, and 
Descartes wrote about human superiority.”) (citing TOM REGAN, ALL THAT DWELL THEREIN: 
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 5 (1982); STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: 
TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 17 (2000)).	 
	 65	 See	Satz, supra	note 16, at 63 n.3. 
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lack of compassion towards animals, is perhaps rooted in the belief that  
animals are automatons that do not feel pain or other emotions; 
therefore, any abuse is “unfelt” by the animal.66  Even if one is willing to 
adopt such underlying assumptions, the justification for Descartes’ view 
still falls flat on its face as it fails to provide accountability for human 
behavior, regardless of how or what animals might perceive or feel. 
Whether animals can experience pain would not have been a 
question were it not for the mechanistic views of philosopher 
Rene Descartes that led the way to wholesale abuses of 
animals in the name of science.  Descartes contended that 
animals responded to stimuli the way a clock chimes—purely 
automatically and without sensation or the desire to 
communicate.67  
Applying Descartes’ views to the California foie gras law, there 
would be no reason to restrict the feeding methods, as the subject 
animal purportedly lacks the ability to feel any pain from such 
methods.68   
Descartes’ views about animal pain and emotion are unsound, 
however, when contextually analyzed by any person who has interacted 
with domestic or wild animals.69  Why would any animal howl, squeal, 
or otherwise outcry specifically when subjected to pain stimuli if that 
animal did not feel pain?  One cannot credibly argue that the animal is 
merely mimicking what a human would do in the same situation.  
Moreover, why would an animal inflict pain upon others (humans or 
 
	 66	 See	Satz, supra	note 16, at 63 n.3.		See	also	Chandola, supra	note 23, at 19-20 (“Rene 
Descartes, the great French philosopher and mathematician who did not deviate from 
traditional western religious thought regarding animals, established the precedent in 
modern thinking that animals were like machines or automata without souls or 
consciousness.  During Descartes’ period, in the seventeenth century, vivisection 
became widespread in Europe where many of the leading scientists referred to 
themselves as ‘cartesians’ in reference to Descartes’ theory that animals were similar to 
mechanical entities.  While painful experiments were starting to be performed on 
animals, vivisection also revealed the great similarity between animals and humans.”). 
 67 Taimie L. Bryan, Trauma,	Law,	and	Advocacy	for	Animals,	1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 63, 
109 n.124 (2006). 
	 68	 See	supra	notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
	 69	 See	Chandola, supra	note 23, at 14 (“Tom Regan, who is credited with being the 
founder of the animal rights view, argues that those nonhuman animals which possess 
various attributes such as perception, memory, ability to feel pain and suffering, 
psychophysical identity, and an ability to act in accordance with beliefs and desires 
possess inherent value.  All beings possessing inherent value who share interests based 
on a relevant similarity must have such interests treated equally.  An interest in 
attending college is not a relevant similarity shared by human and nonhuman animals, 
but there exists a common interest in avoiding pain and suffering.  Such relevant 
interests must be protected by rights in accordance with the respect principle or duty of 
justice.”)  See	also,	Tischler supra	note 22, at 504. 
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animals) when defending itself through biting, scratching, or other 
conduct, if the subject animal did not conceptually understand the 
concept and feeling of pain? 
b. Moral Pluralism   
To eat animals, or not to eat animals; that is the question.  Dr. 
Robert Garner has evaluated the perspectives that allow humans to eat 
animals, or not to eat animals, in the context of moral pluralism.70  Dr. 
Garner posits that although there is room for animal rights in the 
theories of John Rawls, Brian Barry, and other leading political 
philosophers, traditional notions of animal welfare do not integrate into 
the framework of modern justice in our system of jurisprudence.71  
“[H]uman ‘conduct toward animals is not regulated by the principles of 
justice, because only “moral persons  . . . [are] entitled to equal 
justice.”‘“72   
Rawls’ approach to the theory of justice requires those protected 
by justice to have “a conception of their good [as expressed by a rational 
plan of life] . . . and . . . a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to 
 
 70 Garner, supra	note 43, at 89 (“It is very noticeable how much human choice is 
invoked in the debate about animal welfare.  This illustrates the influence of the moral 
pluralism central to most liberal theories.  From the moral pluralism viewpoint, we are 
free to choose whether to eat free-range meat or not to eat meat at all, free to avoid 
hunting or fishing, free to visit zoos, and free to resist drugs developed by using animals.  
What we are not entitled to do under this principle, however, is to prevent others from 
eating intensively produced meat, or going hunting and fishing, or visiting zoos, or 
partaking in drugs developed through animal testing, just because some of us find such 
activities morally repugnant.  The state, therefore, must remain neutral when it comes 
to competing conceptions of the moral status of animals.”).  
 71 Garner, supra note 43, at 87-88 (“The problem occurs where, as in the liberalism 
associated with Rawls, and other leading names in political philosophy such as Brian 
Barry, the harm principle does not apply because animals are excluded from a theory of 
justice . . . .  Despite excluding animals from a theory of justice, Rawls, Barry, and others 
clearly accept that what is done to animals matters morally, and that there should be 
some restrictions on the way they are treated.  This apparent contradiction can be 
explained by the fact that these thinkers seem to be making the point that justice is a 
much narrower area of inquiry than ethics . . . .  Rawls is arguing that the treatment of 
animals should be discussed in the arena of morals rather than the arena of justice.  
However, the effect of excluding animals from a theory of justice is problematic for 
animals in a liberal society because a basic principle of most liberal theories is the 
assumption that it is no business of a liberal society to advocate one conception of the 
good over another.  In other words, any genuine liberal political theory must include an 
anti-perfectionist principle of moral pluralism.  This is the idea, derived from a wider 
theory of liberty, that it is no business of the state or society to interfere in individual 
moral codes or individual conceptions of the good life . . . .  Taking this liberal theory to 
its logical conclusion, the treatment of animals becomes a matter of individual moral 
choice rather than a matter of justice.”). 
 72 Garner, supra note 43, at 87.  
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apply and to act upon the principles of justice . . .”73  Dr. Garner notes 
that under this rationale, “only those who can understand what it is to 
be just, and are able to claim it for themselves and respect the rights of 
others, are entitled to be beneficiaries of justice.”74  There are notable 
flaws in using the capacity to understand and respect the rights of others 
as the basis for justice.  “[P]ersons who are senile may not have the 
capacity to use tools, language, or exhibit a high intellect; yet, they are 
still rights holders.”75 
Under Rawls’ philosophy, objective notions of justice fall short of 
application to animals.  Dr. Garner observes that justice is merely a small 
region contained within the greater realm of ethics and morals.76  Within 
the context of ethics and morals, Rawls’ theory, and other modern 
political theories, affords individuals	the ability to choose to engage in 
animal protection but fails to afford broader societal protection of 
animals.   
As a result of this moral pluralism, 
we are free to choose whether to eat free-range meat or not to 
eat meat at all, free to avoid hunting or fishing, free to visit 
zoos, and free to resist drugs developed by using animals.  
What we are not entitled to do under this principle, however, 
is to prevent others from eating intensively produced meat, or 
going hunting and fishing, or visiting zoos, or partaking in 
drugs developed through animal testing, just because some of 
us find such activities morally repugnant.  The state, therefore, 
must remain neutral when it comes to competing conceptions 
of the moral status of animals.77  
Under Rawls’ theory of justice, personal choice allows the 
individual	to be vegetarian, to buy free range and organic meats, and to 
avoid consumption of veal, foie gras, or other arguably “cruel” forms of 
animal products.78  “Taking this liberal theory to its logical conclusion, 
 
 73 Garner, supra note 43, at 87-88.	
 74 Garner, supra note 43,	at 88. 
 75 Kniaz, supra	note 21, at 771. 
 76 Garner, supra	note 43, at 87-89, 91 (“There is convincing evidence that differential 
animal protection achievements can be explained by the impact of political and social 
factors, backed by a dominant form of liberalism in the United States that excludes 
animals from a theory of justice.  According to this liberal doctrine of moral pluralism, 
individuals should be left alone to pursue their own conceptions of the good life, and the 
state and society should not intervene to impose one particular moral code over 
another.  As a result, the treatment of animals becomes subject to moral preferences 
rather than legal compulsion.”)  
 77 Garner, supra note 43, at 89. 
	 78	 See	Garner, supra	note 43, at 87-88. 
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the treatment of animals becomes a matter of individual moral choice 
rather than a matter of justice.”79   
The California foie gras legislation would be unnecessary under 
moral pluralism, as each individual could decide to eat, or not eat, foie 
gras or any other animal product.  Although animal welfare may align 
with individual choices, moral pluralism lacks the pervasiveness of 
societal protection to qualify for use beyond the coarse level of filtration.  
In its human centric basis, moral pluralism is founded in individual 
choice, rather than societal obligation.  
c. Speciesist Utilitarianism   
I’ve elected to demarcate this category as “speciesist 
utilitarianism,” which is human centric, in order to clearly differentiate 
it from utilitarian theories that consider the suffering of animals.80  A 
utilitarian analysis of any activity depends upon the cost-benefit 
formula used to appraise the underlying utility.81 From the perspective 
of the animal used to produce foie gras, there is infinite cost and zero 
benefit.  Since humans are the ones ascribing utilitarian value in a cost-
benefit analysis, however, utilitarianism is rife with human-centric 
focus.82  The subjectivity of such a cost-benefit analysis is problematic, 
as it can only be reconciled by agreeing upon some basic paradigm to 
guide the ascription of value.  Speciesist utilitarianism, where only 
human desires are considered, is encompassed within the coarse level 
of filtration because the equation of utility is exclusively human focused. 
Utilitarian analysis could be deployed in a non-speciesist manner 
to account for the suffering of other living creatures and value of life, 
 
 79 Garner, supra note 43, at 88. 
	 80	 See	generally	PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: THE DEFINITIVE CLASSIC OF THE ANIMAL 
MOVEMENT (Harper Perennial ed. 2009); Colb, supra	note 18; Barnaby E. McLaughlin, A	
Conspiracy	of	Life:	A	Posthumanist	Critique	of	Approaches	to	Animal	Rights	in	the	Law, 14 
U.MASS. L. REV. 150, 157-58 (2019). 
	 81	 See	 generally Goodman, supra	 note 57, at 1293 (“Rights-based arguments 
compete with distinctly utilitarian traditions, which recognize in animals no inviolable 
rights . . .”).	 
 82 Goodman, supra note 57,	at	1298-99 (“Epstein, among others, notes the problem 
of measuring pleasures and pains.  The social utility in human-to-human interactions 
can in theory be measured by a person’s willingness to pay for pleasure or to avoid pain.  
According to this measure, an action causes more pleasure than pain if the winners still 
come out ahead after compensating the losers for their pain.  Such a calculation is 
impossible across species.”); see	 also	 McLaughlin, supra	 note 80, at 158 (“While 
utilitarianism does a great deal to challenge the Cartesian world, it ultimately fails to 
escape a humanist discourse. Though never articulated specifically, utilitarian 
insistence on ‘suffering’ as the prerequisite, applied analytically and dispassionately, 
does little to articulate animals having interests in and of themselves that may be 
separate from simply a shared and identifiable human-like ‘suffering.’”). 
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thus producing an equation that is not a reflection of the pure pleasure 
or monetary interests founded in a human centric scheme.83  Those 
alternative utilitarian influenced paradigms, allowing for some 
consideration of animal welfare, fall outside of the coarse level of 
filtration, and are further addressed later in this Article. 
The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (“AETA”) is an example of 
legislation within the realm of speciesist utilitarianism, as the law is 
purely for the protection of human interests, rather than animal 
interests.84  The law is aimed at protecting the economic interests—and 
potentially human safety interests—of businesses and organizations 
that maintain animals in their operations, such as teaching hospitals, as 
well as the food industry, biomedical industry, and fur industry.85  The 
AETA fails to account for the burdens, costs, and externalities (e.g. death, 
suffering) placed upon animal subjects.  Food handling laws that are 
centered around human health and safety also come within the 
penumbra of speciesist utilitarianism and are appropriate for analysis 
at the coarse level of the filter.86   
d. Chattel Theory 
Under the views of James Madison, “Government is instituted to 
protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various 
rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses.  This 
being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which 
impartially secures to every man whatever is his own.”87  
Protection of animals as chattels only occurs when human 
ownership and human safety interests coincide with animal 
protection.88  One difficulty in addressing humane treatment of animals 
can be attributed to the concept of ownership.89  Ownership “implies 
 
	 83	 See	generally	Evans supra	note 62, at 177-180 (discussing how a utilitarian could 
posit that humans must ascribe feelings and values, and therefore human utility, to all 
species in order for the utilitarian equation to function towards animal protection).   
 84 18 U.S.C. §43 (2020). 
 85 Berger, supra	note 30, at 301-302. 
	 86	 See text and accompanying notes at 61-63, supra. 
 87 Nick Dranias, The	Local	Liberty	Charter:	Restoring	Grassroots	Liberty	to	Restrain	
Cities	Gone	Wild, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 113, 158-59 (2010) (quoting James Madison, Property, 
reprinted	in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 515 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999)).  
 88 Satz, supra	note 16, at 67. 
	 89	 See	Garner, supra	note 43, at 78-79 (“In the first place, not all animals are regarded 
as the property of private citizens, yet this has not prevented them from being 
mercilessly exploited. Wild animals, for example, fall into this category.  While there are 
various ways in which ownership of wild animals can and has been conferred, without 
this confirmation, animals in the wild are not owned by private citizens.  Despite this 
fact, wild animals are not regarded as possessors of rights.  Conversely, it should be 
ANDERSON (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2021  5:52 PM 
60 SETON	HALL	LEGISLATIVE	JOURNAL [Vol. 45:1 
entitlements to the owner” and consequently carries an implication that 
the owner may have the right to do as he or she pleases with the 
animal.90 
If the chattel property status of animals were eliminated, this 
would beg the question of whether the legal status of “personhood” is—
or should be—concomitantly conferred to animals.  Indeed, if animals 
receive legal “person” status, it would be difficult to continue the 
practice of raising animals for slaughter and consumption, unless we 
conterminously adapt a standard of cannibalism as acceptable.   
It is a strange state of affairs that corporations carry the rights of 
personhood,91 despite not being sentient living beings.  How can we call 
the paper fiction of a corporation a “person,” while simultaneously 
allowing living creatures mere property status as non-persons?  Chattel 
theory directs us to the simple explanation that humans are ultimately 
more concerned with property and ownership rights than the legal 
status of other living creatures.   
e. Coarse Filtration Applied To The California Foie Gras 
Law 
The coarse level of the filter is appropriate for reviewing legislation 
impacting animals only where the animal protection component is a 
secondary result of human-centric legislation.  The California foie gras 
law is focused on the treatment of the food animals during their lifetime, 
92 rather than on food safety or other human safety.  The purpose of this 
 
noted that there are cases where domestication, and therefore ownership, has had 
positive implications for wild animals. For instance, although contentious, it might be 
suggested that animal species with little or no chance of surviving in the wild, that are 
kept in zoos with very good records of environmental enrichment, benefit from human 
ownership.”); David Favre, Living	Property:	A	New	Status	For	Animals	Within	The	Legal	
System,	  93 MARQ. L. REV. 1021, 1044 (Spring 2010) (“Wild beings within natural 
ecosystems are not personal property.  While governments assert the right to control 
access to wild animals, they do not have possessory rights or ownership of wild 
animals.  The state does not possess these animals, and has little control over them and 
little responsibility for their well-being, at least at the present.  While wild animals have 
many of the same sorts of interests as domestic animals and therefore a basis for legal 
rights, the legal context for acknowledging them will require a different analysis than is 
provided in this Article.  For example, the concepts of living space and duty of care have 
to be different when the animals are not possessed by humans.”). 	
 90 Garner, supra	note 43, at 81-84. 
	 91	 See	generally	Konstantin Tretyakov, Corporate	Identity	and	Group	Dignity,	8 WASH. 
U. JURIS. REV. 171 (2016); Nick J. Sciullo, Reassessing	Corporate	Personhood	in	the	Wake	of	
Occupy	Wall	 Street,	22 WIEDENER L. J. 611 (2013); Stuart Kirsch, Imagining	Corporate	
Personhood,	37 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 207 (Nov. 2014). 
	 92	 See	generally	Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,	Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et 
d’Oies du Québec v. Becerra, (No. 17-1285), 2018 WL 1315086, at*22 (March 9, 2018) 
(“As Justice Sotomayor more recently put it, ‘The primary purpose of a food of any kind 
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law is not for human protection and, thus, it must pass through and 
beyond the coarse level of filtration for proper evaluation and analysis.  
Indeed, theories at the coarse level actually would oppose and nullify 
this law, because it does not pertain to human protection.  In this 
respect, the filter is useful in eschewing erroneous and misleading 
analysis of the underlying legislation. 
2. MEDIUM FILTRATION 
The medium level of filtration is best suited to analyze legislation 
that is designed to address some specific component of animal 
protection but countered with some underlying carve-out reflecting 
human self-interests that have been reserved.  This level of filtration 
contains legislation based upon the whim of collective societal ethics 
implemented through legislation and regulation.  Samples of relevant 
theories at this level of filtration include: Deontology, Bentham, and 
Singer Utilitarianism.  
a. Deontology (Kant):   
Immanuel Kant recognized that humans have an obligation in their 
treatment of animals.93 
Deontological or rights-based views are derived from the 
tradition of Immanuel Kant . . .  who believed that rights are 
possessed by, and duties are owed to, beings capable of 
mutual justification and reason-giving.  While nonhuman 
animals do not possess these capacities and therefore cannot 
themselves be rights-holders, Kant believed that humans have 
indirect duties to animals. Cruelty to animals, Kant argues, 
offends humanity: “A master who turns out his ass or his dog 
because the animal can no longer earn its keep manifests a 
small mind.”  Under Kant’s view, it is likely that the cruelties 
of factory farming and animal experimentation would offend 
our humanity, though meat consumption could be justified if 
the raising and slaughtering of animals was performed 
humanely.94  
Applying this theory to the California foie gras law reveals that the 
law inadequately fulfils human duties to animals because the law bans 
inhumane force-feeding practices but continues to allow the slaughter 
of animals for foie gras (and other purposes). 
 
is to be eaten.’ Tr. of Arg. in No. 16-111, at 15:24-25.”); Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et 
d’Oies du Québec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2017),	cert.	denied 139 S.Ct. 
862 (2019). 
	 93	 See	Satz, supra	note 16, at 77. 
 94 Satz, supra	note 16, at 77. 
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b. Bentham And Singer Utilitarianism 
Allowing the pain and pleasure of other species to influence 
determinations of animal treatment can provide for some level of 
animal protection.   
[T]he subjectivity inherent in the utilitarianism allowed 
Jeremy Bentham to argue for animal anticruelty laws.  
“Benthamites play the game of deriving public policy from the 
greatest-happiness principle without rules, and the set of 
public policies he proposed resembles nothing so much as his 
personal preferences (he was notoriously fond of animals, 
especially cats).”95  
Animal rights commentator Peter Singer also challenges speciesist 
utilitarianism, and views animals as having the same ability to 
experience pain and other sensations as sentient beings.96  “Under 
Singer’s view, the suffering (or happiness) of nonhuman sentient 
animals should be given equal consideration to the suffering (or 
happiness) of human animals.”97  Using a utilitarian equation to register 
the pain of animals requires that humans not be speciesist bullies and 
that humans instead engage in assiduous analysis of animal pain, 
suffering, rights, and interests.  Unfortunately, “the law measures 
nonhuman animals with a human yardstick.”98  The resultant 
subjectivity of utilitarianism makes it difficult to harness and 
consistently apply meaningful parameters.99  As Judge Posner has 
commented, this approach to animal rights is only functional when 
rational human actors are prepared to “value nonhuman animal 
interests to provide for those protections.”100 
Under Singer’s utilitarian analysis, 
 [t]he suffering of animals in factory farms, laboratories, the 
entertainment industry, and households must be weighed 
against human satisfaction derived from the use of animals in 
 
 95 Evans, supra	note 62, at 177-78.   
	 96	 See	generally	PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2d. ed. 1990); Satz, supra	note 16, 
at 75-76. 
 97 Satz, supra	note 16, at 76. 
 98 Evans, supra	note 62, at 181.  
 99 Evans, supra note 62,	 at 178 (“[W]hether they are included is entirely 
subjective.”). 
 100 Evans, supra note 62,	at 180; see	also	Goodman, supra	note 57, at 1302 (“Posner’s 
alternative to rights or strictly utilitarian approaches is a ‘soft utilitarian’ commitment 
to take seriously the suffering of animals. Empathy, not moral duty, requires this 
commitment.  Animal suffering matters because it debases humanity and causes (or 
should cause) human suffering.  The sly importation of a prescriptive element here 
nearly unravels Posner’s humanist theory, since what humans should feel is a question 
of ethics—what they owe to animals-not empathy.”). 
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these contexts.  For example, human pleasure in consuming a 
ham sandwich cannot outweigh the profound suffering of a 
pig. . . . To argue otherwise, Singer suggests, would be 
speciesist.101   
Under Singer’s approach, humans may make the decision that their 
lives have more value than animal life.102  In the review of this concept 
by Professor Ani Satz, she begs the question as to whether the sacrifice 
of “100 million mice to find a cure for a common cancer that affects 2.5 
million people” can be justified.103  Applying Singer’s theory, the 
ultimate conclusion depends on the details of each specific situation and 
a balancing of the interests à	la non-speciesist utilitarianism, albeit 
determined by humans.104 
Applying this type of utilitarianism, if a choice had to be made 
between saving an innocent rabbit105 or a convicted child molester 
human, the rabbit should be the clear winner.  This choice contradicts 
speciesist utilitarianism, where the human would be saved.  Delving 
further into the discussion on the point raised by Professor Satz, many 
humans have no difficulty in killing “home invasion” mice in order to 
prevent prospective damage to homes and contamination through 
disease.106  When the discussion turns to breeding laboratory mice for 
the purpose of experimentation, however, an entirely different set of 
questions arises.  This raises the not so rhetorical question of how many 
“innocent” mouse lives equate to the value of a human life?  What if we 
account for the character and value of each specific mouse sacrificed and 
each specific human benefited?  Why sacrifice a kind, even-tempered, 
well groomed, healthy mouse to save the life of a despicable and violent 
human?  Again, this level of inquiry is not intended to suggest that it is 
an easy task to commence moral inquiry into the lives of animals (doing 
so with humans is perplexing enough), but rather is intended to 
exemplify the challenge in balancing human versus animal interests at 
the medium stage of the filter. 
c. Medium Filtration Applied To The California Foie 
 
 101 Satz, supra	note 16, at 76. 
 102 Satz, supra	note 16, at 76-77. 
 103 Satz, supra	note 16, at 77. 
	 104	 See	supra	note 37 and accompanying text. 
 105 I am unaware of, and my research has not revealed, any guilty rabbits.  
	 106	 See	generally	CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Trap	Up!	Trap	Rodents	
Around	 the	 Home	 to	 Help	 Reduce	 the	 Rodent	 Population,	
https://www.cdc.gov/rodents/prevent_infestations/trap_up.html (last visited 
December 18, 2020). 
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Gras Law 
The medium level of filtration exposes the trade-off between 
human desires and some aspect of animal protection.  The California foie 
gras legislation is designed to make humans feel virtuous by restricting 
force-feeding practices.  Within this context, the legislation contains vast 
gerrymandering of rights and interests.  Though the California law 
addresses treatment of birds.107 The law continues to allow for the 
slaughter and sale of these birds;108 it allows for the sale of foie gras 
raised through non-force-feeding methods;109 and it fails to address any 
other aspect of the treatment of these animals.110  
Embodied in the California foie gras legislation is an underlying 
legislative and utilitarian compromise: foie gras is an extravagant 
gourmet delicacy, and the pain/suffering of the force	fed animal exceeds 
the benefit to those who consume such force-fed foie gras.111  The law 
does not prohibit sale of non-force fed foie gras, or any other types of 
bird meat (excluding foie gras product) potentially raised through force-
feeding or other adverse conditions.112  At the medium stage of filtration, 
it becomes apparent that the California foie gras law is highly specific 
and delimited in scope.  I interpret the focus on protection of force-fed 
birds as akin to a legislative moral carbon offset in the realm of animal 
protection; one particular type of animal is protected under a limited set 
of circumstances.113 
3. Fine Filtration   
The fine level of filtration moves away from utilitarian ascription 
of costs and benefits, and instead focuses upon the issue of vulnerability.  
Professor Ani Satz’s vulnerable subject theory provides an appropriate 
method for analyzing legislation/regulation at the fine level of 
filtration.114  Review at this level moves past utilitarian analysis of 
 
 107 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25980(a) (2020). 
	 108	 Id.	at §§ 25980-25984. 
	 109	 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25981 (2020) (“A person may not force-feed a bird for 
the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver beyond normal size, or hire another person to 
do so.”).  
	 110	 Id.	at §§ 25980-25984.	
 111 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25982 (2020) (“A product may not be sold in California 
if it is the result of force-feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver 
beyond normal size.”). 
 112 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25980-25984 (2020).  See	infra	notes 121, 123-125, 
and accompanying text. 
 113 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25980-25984 (2020). 
 114 Satz, supra	note 16, at 78-80. 
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human benefit versus animal cost, and instead focuses upon a 
situational analysis of the subject animal.   
a. Vulnerability Theory (Satz):   
In explaining her vulnerability theory, Satz notes that 
animals are part of our moral community because they are a 
constitutive part of our environment and contribute to its 
diversity.  Thus, animals within our ecosystem are vulnerable 
to disturbances and possess claims to noninterference 
regardless of sentience, or the ability to suffer.  This view is 
the most inclusive approach to the moral status of animals 
because it creates a presumption against harm to all animals 
regardless of mental properties.115   
Satz further notes that “[t]he permanent dependency of domestic 
animals is created and controlled by humans, rendering them uniquely 
vulnerable to exploitation.”116  Humans are therefore ethically obligated 
to consider the health, safety, and welfare of nonhuman animals, as such 
creatures are vulnerable to the imposition of our destructive human 
will.   
Vulnerability theory forces us to expand the level of inquiry 
without halting at the customary utilitarian cost-benefit border.  Satz 
has referenced the application of Martha Fineman’s concepts on the 
topic, where vulnerability is “the possibility of becoming dependent.”117  
This means that the “vulnerable subject may have episodic or 
permanent dependency on others.”118   
 
First, animal capacities for suffering are morally relevant, as 
are higher-order capacities, such as the ability to see oneself 
existing over time.  Second, it is speciesist to privilege human 
over nonhuman animal suffering.  Speciesism gives rise to 
legal gerrymandering, undermining animal protections and 
creating legal inconsistencies.  Third, human and nonhuman 
animals are universally vulnerable to suffering, and their most 
basic capabilities must be treated equally before nonhuman 
animals may be used to support higher-order human 
capabilities.  State institutions must not privilege humans in 
 
 115 Satz, supra	note 16, at 78. 
 116 Satz, supra	note 16, at 80. (This theory notes that the dependence of non-human 
domestic animals is permanent.  Throughout their lives, domestic animals rely on 
humans to provide them nourishment, shelter, and other care.).   
 117 Satz, supra	note 16, at 79. 
 118 Satz, supra	note 16, at 79. 
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responding to universal vulnerability affecting certain basic 
capabilities.119 
Exercising artistic license and taking the liberty of applying Satz’s 
vulnerability theory, I offer some examples of how vulnerability theory 
can be useful in allowing granular level (hence, the fine filter stage) 
review of situational circumstances. 
Let us assume that a lioness escapes from a zoo and roams a 
neighborhood full of humans.  The lioness might not initially appear to 
be vulnerable.  She is a powerful carnivore, capable of capturing and 
eating any human.  Actions taken to stop the lioness, including terminal 
measures, might seem in order.  Deeper examination within 
vulnerability theory, however, reveals that it is humans who placed the 
lioness in the zoo, and humans who failed to provide appropriate 
containment and allowed the lioness to escape.  Humans being stalked 
by the escaped lioness are only at risk because other humans, those 
responsible for the care of the lioness, were negligent and created this 
risk.  Does this mean that the lioness should be allowed to consume 
humans in the neighborhood?  Not necessarily; however, the 
vulnerability analysis helps us to engage in this granular, fine level 
review. 
As a second example, let us assume that a mountain lion is stalking 
a hiker on a trail as part of a delicious meal plan.  Should the hiker have 
the right to kill the mountain lion?  The hiker initially appears to be more 
vulnerable and at-risk.  But what if the trail is part of a vast human 
encroachment upon the native habitat of this animal, and the 
construction of homes/parks/etc. has barricaded the mountain lion into 
a tiny, isolated space?  The mountain lion may now appear to be 
vulnerable if penalized for stalking the human. 
As a third example, assume that there is a healthy duck that has 
flown into a pond in a public park.  This duck is vulnerable, with many 
natural predators, including humans.  A law protecting such ducks 
would seem in order under these circumstances.  If, however, the same 
duck is harboring a disease that adversely affects other animals (or 
humans), then this duck’s diseased status could render others 
vulnerable, and at-risk. 
These examples demonstrate that vulnerability theory provides an 
additional angle of analysis.  Vulnerability analysis brings new light 
through old windows, by moving the inquiry away from customary 
 
 119 Satz, supra	note 16, at 80. 
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utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, and evaluating animals within the same 
moral community as humans.120  
b. Fine Filtration Applied To The California Foie Gras 
Law 
When the vulnerability analysis is applied to the California’s foie 
gras law it illuminates that the law only applies to sales within 
California, and that the law continues to allow sale of foie gras produced 
through methods other than force-feeding.  The fine level of filtration 
further reveals the selectivity of the law in that it allows the same 
animals to be raised—and even force-fed—for meat sales (excluding 
foie gras).121  Concomitantly, the fact that there is no human “need” to 
consume foie gras is also illuminated at this level.122  Moreover, the fine 
level of filtration exposes the fact that the California foie gras law only 
partially addresses its purported purpose of protecting animal welfare, 
as the vulnerable subjects (namely birds),123 if force-fed, may be sold as 
long as the liver is not sold,124 and birds which are not force-fed are 
devoid of any such sales restrictions.125   
 
 120 Satz, supra	note 16, at 78. 
	 121	 See	Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 944 
(9th Cir. 2013). (“Plaintiffs contend that the district court correctly concluded that § 
25982 prohibits the sale of all products from force-fed birds including duck breasts and 
down jackets. The State argues that § 25982 covers only products that are the result of 
force-feeding a bird to enlarge its liver beyond normal size, i.e., products made from an 
enlarged duck liver. We agree with the State’s interpretation.”). 
	 122	 See	 Sullivan and Wolfson,	 supra	 note 4, at 153 (“Of course, it is possible to 
distinguish between different foods produced from different animals according to how 
essential they are, and to argue that a culinary delicacy like foie gras does not deserve 
the same measure of consideration as other, more basic, foods.  And yet, was we have 
said, making this distinction might open the door to the most microscopic distinctions.  
It seems obvious that Justice Grunis is correct, in that no animal-based food is actually 
necessary for human existence, at least in a society where numerous plant-based 
‘substitute’ foods are available.”). 
 123 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25980(a) (2020) (“A bird includes, but is not limited 
to, a duck or goose.”). 
	 124	 See	Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies du Quebec, 729 F.3d at 944. 
 125 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25982 (2020) (“A product may not be sold in California 
if it is the result of force-feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver 
beyond normal size.”)  Although California does have a criminal law prohibiting 
enumerated types of animal cruelty, but obviously force-feeding of birds does not fall 
within the scope of this law or else those producing foie gras in California would have 
been subjected to criminal prosecution, and the legislature would not have deemed it 
necessary to enact the foie gras law.  See	 CAL. PENAL CODE § 597 (2020). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
My proposed filter-based analysis model is designed to provide an 
additional tool in analyzing animal protection legislation.  It is neither 
intended to be a stand-alone analytic tool, nor to supplant the panoply 
of other methods and theories available to us in addressing animal 
protection.  The underlying goal is to improve discussions and foster 
productive debate.   
The filter can help to sort through a wide range of animal 
protection legislation by addressing human-centric laws (coarse filter), 
combined human and animal interests measured through human utility 
(medium filter), or legislation centered on vulnerability, dependence, 
and “at-risk” conditions (fine filter).  This process is intended to aid in 
revealing strengths and weaknesses, including areas for improvement, 
in animal protection legislation. 
Animals do not have a jury of peers determining their rights and 
protections.  The way we treat and protect other animal beings is a 
massive reflection on who and what we are as humans.  Such reflection 
must, a	 priori, extend to the humane care and treatment of animals, 
including the circumstances surrounding their life and death.  By 
treating animals responsibly and properly, we become better humans.  
